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Economic analysis and evidence indicate the market for corporate
control is benefiting shareholders, society, and the corporate form of
organization. The value of transactions in this market ran at a record rate
of about $180 billion per year in 1985 and 1986--47 percent above the
1984 record of $122 billion. The number of transactions with purchase
prices exceeding one billion dollars was 27 of 3300 deals in 1986 and 36 of
3000 deals in 1985 (Grimm 1986). There were only seven billion-dollar-
plus deals in total, prior to 1980. In addition to these takeovers, mergers,
and leveraged buyouts, there were numerous corporate restructurings
involving divestitures, spinoffs, and large stock repurchases for cash and
debt.
The gains to shareholders from these transactions have been huge.
The gains to selling-firm shareholders from mergers and acquisition ac-
tivity in the period 1977-86 total $346 billion (in 1986 dollars).1 The gains
to buying-firm shareholders are harder to estimate, and to my knowl-
edge no one has done so yet, but I estimate that they would add at least
another $50 billion to the total. These gains, to put them in perspective,
equal 51 percent of the total cash dividends (valued in 1986 dollars) paid
to investors by the entire corporate sector in the past decade.2
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Corporate control transactions and the restructurings that often ac-
company them can be wrenching events in the lives of those linked to
the involved organizations: the managers, employees, suppliers, cus-
tomers and residents of surrounding communities. Restructurings usu-
ally involve major organizational change (such as shifts in corporate
strategy) to meet new competition or market conditions, increased use
of debt, and a flurry of recontracting with managers, employees, suppli-
ers and customers. This activity sometimes results in expansion of re-
sources devoted to certain areas and at other times in contractions
involving plant closings, layoffs of top-level and middle managers and
of staff and production workers, and reduced compensation.
Change due to corporate restructuring requires people and commu-
nities associated with the organization to adjust the ways they live, work
and do business. It is not surprising, therefore, that this change creates
controversy and that those who stand to lose are demanding that some-
thing be done to stop the process. At the same time, shareholders in
restructured corporations are clear-cut winners; in recent years restruc-
turings have generated average increases in total market value of ap-
proximately 50 percent.
Those threatened by the changes argue that corporate restructuring
is damaging the U.S. economy, that this activity damages the morale
and productivity of organizations and pressures executives to manage
for the short term. Further, they hold that the value that restructuring
creates does not come from increased efficiency and productivity; rather,
the gains come from lower tax payments, broken contracts with manag-
ers, employees and others, and mistakes in valuation by inefficient cap-
ital markets. Since the benefits are illusory and the costs are real, they
argue, takeover activity should be restricted.
The controversy has been accompanied by strong pressure on regu-
lators and legislatures to enact restrictions to curb activity in the market
for corporate control. Dozens of congressional bills in the past several
years have proposed new restrictions on takeovers, but as of August
1987, none had passed. The Business Roundtable, composed of the chief
executive officers of the 200 largest corporations in the country, has
pushed hard for restrictive legislation. Within the past several years the
legislatures of New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Con-
necticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Minnesota and
1 Estimated from data in Grimm (1986). Grimm provides total dollar values for all
merger and acquisition deals for which there are publicly announced prices amounting to
at least $500,000 or 10 percent of the firm and in which at least one of the firms was a U.S.
company. Grimm also counts in its numerical totals deals with no publicly announced
prices that it believes satisfy these criteria. I have assumed that the deals with no an-
nounced prices were on average equal to 20 percent of the size of the announced transac-
tions and carried the same average premium.
2 Total dividend payments by the corporate sector, unadjusted for inflation, are given
in Weston and Copeland (1986, p. 649). I extended these estimates to 1986.104 Michael C. Jensen
Massachusetts have passed antitakeover laws. The Federal Reserve
Board implemented new restrictions in early 1986 on the use of debt in
certain takeovers.
In all the controversy over takeover activity, it is often forgotten that
only 40 (an all-time record) of the 3,300 takeover transactions in 1986
were hostile tender offers. There were 110 voluntary or negotiated
tender offers (unopposed by management) and the remaining 3,100-plus
deals were also voluntary transactions agreed to by management. This
simple classification, however, is misleading since many of the volun-
tary transactions would not have occurred absent the threat of hostile
takeover. A major reason for the current outcry is that in recent years
mere size alone has disappeared as an effective takeover deterrent, and
the managers of many of our largest and least efficient corporations now
find their jobs threatened by disciplinary forces in the capital markets.
Through dozens of studies, economists have accumulated consider-
able evidence and knowledge, on the effects of the takeover market.
Most of the earlier work is well summarized elsewhere (Jensen and Ru-
back 1983; Jensen 1984; Jarrell, Brickley and Netter 1988). Here, I focus
on current aspects of the controversy. In brief, the previous work tells us
the following:
® Takeovers benefit shareholders of target companies. Premiums in
hostile offers historically exceed 30 percent on average, and in
recent times have averaged about 50 percent.
Acquiring-firm shareholders on average earn about 4 percent in
hostile takeovers and roughly zero in mergers, although these
returns seem to have declined from past levels.
® Takeovers do not waste credit or resources. Instead, they generate
substantial gains: historically, 8 percent of the total value of both
companies.
® Actions by managers that eliminate or prevent offers or mergers
are most suspect as harmful to shareholders.
® Golden parachutes for top-level managers do not, on average,
harm shareholders.
The activities of takeover specialists (such as Icahn, Posner, Stein-
berg, and Pickens) benefit shareholders on average.
® Merger and acquisition activity has not increased industrial con-
centration. Over 1200 divestitures valued at $59.9 billion occurred
in 1986, also a record level (Grimm 1986).
® Takeover gains do not come from the creation of monopoly
power.
Although measurement problems make it difficult to estimate the
returns to bidders as precisely as the returns to targets,3 it appears the
3 See Jensen and Ruback (1983, pp. 18ff).THE FREE CASH FLOW THEORY 105
bargaining power of target managers, coupled with competition among
potential acquirers, grants a large share of the acquisition benefits to
selling shareholders. In addition, federal and state regulation of tender
offers appears to have strengthened the hand of target firms; premiums
received by target-firm shareholders increased substantially after intro-
duction of such regulation.4
Some have argued that the gains to shareholders come from wealth
reallocations from other parties and not from real increases in efficiency.
Roll (1986) argues the gains to target firm shareholders come from ac-
quiring firm shareholders, but the data are not consistent with this hy-
pothesis. While the evidence on the returns to bidding firms is mixed, it
does not indicate they systematically suffer losses; prior to 1980 share-
holders of bidding firms earned on average about zero in mergers,
which tend to be voluntary, and about 4 percent of their equity value in
tender offers, which more often are hostile (Jensen and Ruback 1983).
These differences in returns are associated with the form of payment
rather than the form of the offer: tender offers tend to be for cash and
mergers tend to be for stock (Huang and Walkling 1987).
Some argue that bondholders in acquired firms systematically suffer
losses as substantial amounts of debt are added to the capital structure.
Asquith and Kim (1982) do not find this, nor do Dennis and McConnell
(1986). The Dennis and McConnell study of 90 matched acquiring and
acquired firms in mergers in the period 1962-80 shows that the values of
bonds, preferred.stock and other senior securities, as well as the com-
mon stock prices of both firms, increase around the merger announce-
ment. Changes in the value of senior securities are not captured in
measures of changes in the value of common stock prices summarized
previously. Taking the changes in the value of senior securities into ac-
count, Dennis and McConnell find the average change in total dollar
value is positive for both bidders and target firms.
Shleiffer and Summers (1987) argue that some of the benefits earned
by target and bidding firm shareholders come from the abrogation of
explicit and implicit long-term contracts with employees. They point to
highly visible recent examples in the airline industry, where mergers
have been frequent and wages have been cut in the wake of deregula-
tion. But given deregulation and free entry by 1.ow~-cost comlvetitors, the
cuts in airline industry wages were inevitable and would have been
accomplished in bankruptcy proceedings if not in negotiations and
takeover-related crises. Medoff and Brown (1988) study this issue using
data from Michigan. They find that both employment and wages are
higher, not lower, after acquisition than would otherwise be expected;
however, their sample consists largely of combinations of small firms.
4 See Jarrell and Bradley (1980). Nathan and O’Keefe (1986), however, provide evi-
dence that this effect occurred in 1974, several years after the major legislation.106 Michael C. Jensen
The Market for Corporate Control
The market for corporate control is best viewed as a major compo-
nent of the managerial labor market. It is the arena in which alternative
management teams compete for the rights to manage corporate re-
sources (Jensen and Ruback 1983). Understanding this point is crucial to
understanding much of the rhetoric about the effects of hostile
takeovers.
Takeovers generally occur because changing technology or market
conditions require a major restructuring of corporate assets (although in
some cases, takeovers occur because incumbent managers are incompe-
tent). Such changes can require abandonment of major projects, reloca-
tion of facilities, changes in managerial assignments, and closure or sale
of facilities or divisions. Managers often have trouble abandoning strate-
gies they have spent years devising and implementing, even when
those strategies no longer contribute to the organization’s survival, and
it is easier for new top-level managers with no ties to current employees
or communities to make changes. Moreover, normal organizational re-
sistance to change commonly is lower early in the reign of new top-level
managers. When the internal processes for change in large corporations
are too slow, costly, and clumsy to bring about the required restructuring
or change in managers efficiently, the capital markets do so through the
market for corporate control. Thus, the capital markets have been re-
sponsible for substantial changes in corporate strategy.
Causes of Current Takeover Activity
A variety of political and economic conditions in the 1980s have
created a climate where economic efficiency requires a major restructur-
ing of corporate assets. These factors include:
The relaxation of restrictions on mergers imposed by the antitrust
laws.
® The withdrawal of resources from industries that are growing
more slowly or that must shrink.
~ Deregulation in the markets for financial services, oil and gas,
transportation, and broadcasting, bringing about a major restruc-
turing of those industries.
® Improvements in takeover technology, including more and in-
creasingly sophisticated legal and financial advisers, and innova-
tions in financing technology (for example, the strip financing
commonly used in leveraged buyouts and the original issuance of
high-yield non-investment-grade bonds).
Each of these factors has contributed to the increase in total take-
over and reorganization activity. Moreover, the first three factors (anti-THE FREE CASH FLOW THEORY 107
Table 1
Intensity of Takeover Activity, by Industry, 1981-84.
Percent Percent
of Total of Total
Takeover Corporate
Industry Classification of Seller Activitya Market Valueb
Oil and Gas 26,3 13.5
Banking and Finance 8.8 6.4
Insurance 5.9 2.9
Food Processing 4,6 4.4
Mining and Minerals 4,4 1.5
Conglomerate 4.4 3,2
Retail Trade 3.6 5.2
Transportation 2,4 2.7
Leisure and Entertainment 2.3 .9
Broadcasting 2.3 .7
Other 39.4 58.5
a Value of merger and acquisition transactions in the industry as a percentage of total takeover transac-
tions for which valuation data are publicly reported. Source: W. 11 Grimm, Mergerstat Review 1984, p. 41.
b Industry value as a percentage of the value of all firms, as of 12/31/84. Total value is measured as the
sum of the market value of common equity for 4,305 companies, including 1,501 companies on the New
York Stock Exchange, 724 companies on the American Stock Exchange, plus 2,080 companies in the
over-the-counter market.
Source: The Media General Financial Weekly, December 31, 1984, p. 17.
trust relaxation, exit, and deregulation) are generally consistent with
data showing the intensity of takeover activity by industry. Table I indi-
cates that acquisition activity in the period 1981-84 was highest in the oil
and gas industry, followed by banking and finance, insurance, food
processing, and mining and minerals. For comparison purposes, the
table also presents data on industry value measured as a percentage of
the total value of all firms. All but two of the industries, retail trade and
transportation, represent a larger fraction of total takeover activity than
their representation in the economy as a whole, indicating that the take-
over market is concentrated in particular industries, not spread evenly
throughout the corporate sector.
Many sectors of the U.S. economy have been experiencing slower
growth and, in some cases, even retrenchment. This phenomenon has
many causes, including substantially increased foreign competition. The
slow growth has meant increased takeover activity because takeovers
play an important role in facilitating exit from an industry or activity.
Changes in energy markets, for example, have required radical restruc-
turing and retrenchment in that industry, and takeovers have played an
important role in accomplishing these changes; oil and gas rank first in
takeover activity, with twice their proportionate share of total activity.108 ’ Michael C. Jensen
Managers who are slow to adjust to the new energy environment and
slow to recognize that many old practices and strategies are no longer
viable find that takeovers are doing the job for them. In an industry
saddled with overcapacity, exit is cheaper to accomplish through merger
and the orderly liquidation of marginal assets of the combined firms
than by disorderly, expensive bankruptcy. The end of the competitive
struggle in such an industry often comes in the bankruptcy courts, with
the unnecessary destruction of valuable parts of organizations that could
be used productively by others.
Similarly, deregulation of the financial services market is consistent
with the number 2 rank of banking and finance and the number 3 rank
of insurance in table 1. Deregulation has also been important in the
transportation and broadcasting industries. Mining and minerals has
been subject to many of the same forces impinging on the energy indus-
try, including the changes in the value of the dollar.
The development of innovative financing vehicles, such as high-
yield non-investment-grade bonds (junk bonds), has removed size as a
significant impediment to competition in the market for corporate con-
trol. Investment grade and high-yield debt issues combined were associ-
ated with 9.8 percent of all tender offer financing from January 1981
through September 1986 (Drexel Burnham Lambert, undated). Even
though not yet widely used in takeovers, these new financing tech-
niques have had important effects because they permit small firms to
obtain resources for acquisition of much larger firms by issuing claims on
the value of the venture (that is, the target firm’s assets) just as in any
other corporate investment activity.
Divestitures
If assets are to move to their most highly valued use, acquirers must
be able to sell off assets to those who can use them more productively.
Therefore, divestitures are a critical element in the functioning of the
corporate control market and it is important to avoid inhibiting them.
Indeed, over 1200 divestitures occurred in 1986, a record level (Mergerstat
Review 1986). This is one reason merger and acquisition activity has not
increased industrial concentration.
Divested plants and assets do not disappear; they are reallocated.
Sometimes they continue to be used in similar ways in the same indus-
try, and in other cases they are used in very different ways and in differ-
ent industries. But in both cases they are moving to uses that their new
owners believe are more productive.
Finally, the takeover and divestiture market provides a private mar-
ket constraint against bigness for its own sake. The potential gains avail-
able to those who correctly perceive that a firm can be purchased for lessTHE FREE CASH FLOW THEORY 109
than the value realizable from the sale of its components provide incen-
tives for entrepreneurs to search out these opportunities and to capital-
ize on them by reorganizing such firms into smaller entities.
The mere possibility of such takeovers also motivates managers to
avoid putting together uneconomic conglomerates and to break up exist-
ing ones. This is now happening. Recently many firms’ defenses against
takeovers appear to have led to actions similar to those proposed by the
potential acquirers. Examples are the reorganizations occurring in the oil
and forest products industries, the sale of "crown jewels," and divesti-
tures brought on by the desire to liquidate large debts incurred to buy
back stock or make other payments to stockholders. The basic economic
sense of these transactions is often lost in a blur of emotional rhetoric
and controversy.
Managerial Myopia versus Market Myopia
It has been argued that, far from pushing managers to undertake
needed structural changes, growing institutional equity holdings and
the fear of takeover cause managers to behave myopically and therefore
to sacrifice long-term benefits to increase short-term profits. The argu-
ments tend to confuse two separate issues: 1) whether managers are
shortsighted and make decisions that undervalue future cash flows
while overvaluing current cash flows (myopic managers); and 2) wheth-
er security markets are shortsighted and undervalue future cash flows
while overvaluing near-term cash flows (myopic markets).
There is little formal evidence on the myopic managers issue, but I
believe this phenomenon does occur. Sometimes it occurs when manag-
ers hold little stock in their companies and are compensated in ways that
motivate them to take actions to increase accounting earnings rather
than the value of the firm. It also occurs when managers make mistakes
because they do notunderstand the forces that determine stock values.
There is much evidence inconsistent with the myopic markets view
and no evidence that indicates it is true:
(1) The mere fact that price-earnings ratios differ widely among se-
curities indicates the market is valuing something other than current
earnings. For example, it values growth as well. Indeed, the essence of a
growth stock is that it has large investment projects yielding few short-
term cash flows but high future earnings and cash flows. The continuing
marketability of new issues for start-up companies with little record of
current earnings, the Genentechs of the world, is also inconsistent with
the notion that the market does not value future earnings.
(2) McConnell and Muscarella (1985) provide evidence that (except
in the oil industry) stock prices respond positively to announcements of
increased investment expenditures and negatively to reduced expendi-110 Michael C. Jensen
tures. Their evidence is also ,~.nconsistent with the notion that the equity
market is myopic, since it indicates that the market values spending
current resources on projects that promise returns in the future.
(3) The vast evidence on efficient markets, indicating that current
stock prices appropriately incorporate all currently available public in-
formation, is also inconsistent with the myopic markets hypothesis. Al-
though the evidence is not literally 100 percent in support of the efficient
market hypothesis, no proposition in any of the social sciences is better
documented.5
(4) Recent versions of the myopic markets hypothesis emphasize
increases in the amount of institutional holdings and the pressure funds
managers face to generate high quarterly returns. It is argued that these
pressures on institutions are a major cause of pressures on corporations
to generate high current quarterly earnings. The institutional pressures
are said to lead to increased takeovers of firms, because institutions are
not loyal shareholders, and to decreased research and development
(R&D) expenditures. It is hypothesized that because R&D expenditures
reduce current earnings, firms making them are more likely to be taken
over, and that reductions in R&D are leading to a fundamental weaken-
ing of the corporate sector of the economy.
A study of 324 firms by the Office of the Chief Economist of the SEC
(1985a) finds substantial evidence that is inconsistent with this version
of the myopic markets argument. The evidence indicates the following:
® Increased institutional stock holdings are not associated with in-
creased takeovers of firms.
® Increased institutional holdings are not associated with decreases
in R&D expenditures.
® Firms with high R&D expenditures are not more vulnerable to
takeovers.
® Stock prices respond positively to announcements of increases in
R&D expenditures.
Moreover, total spending on R&D is increasing concurrent with the
wave of merger and acquisition activity. Total spending on R&D in 1984,
a year of record acquisition activity, increased by 14 percent according to
Business Week’s annual survey. This represented "the biggest gain since
s For an introduction to the literature and empirical evidence on the theory of efficient
markets, see Elton and Gruber (1984), Chapter 15, p. 375ff. and the 167 studies referenced
in the bibliography. For some anomalous evidence on market efficiency, see Jensen (1978).
For recent criticisms of the efficient market hypothesis see Shiller (1981a, b). Marsh and
Merton (1983, 1986) demonstrate that the Shiller tests depend critically on whether, con-
trary to generally accepted financial theory and evidence, the future levels of dividends
follow a stationary stochastic process. Merton (1985) provides a discussion of the current
state of the efficient market hypothesis and concludes (p. 40), "In light of the empirical
evidence on the nonstationarity issue, a pronouncement at this moment that the rational
market theory should be discarded from the economic paradigm can, at best, be described
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R&D spending began a steady climb in the late 1970’s." All industries in
the survey increased R&D spending with the exception of steel. In addi-
tion, R&D spending increased from 2 percent of sales, where it had been
for five years, to 2.9 percent. In 1985 and 1986, two more record years for
acquisition activity, R&D also set new records. R&D spending increased
by 10 percent (to 3.1 percent of sales) in 1985, and in 1986, R&D spend-
ing again increased by 10 percent to $51 billion (3.5 percent of sales), in a
year when total sales decreased by 1 percent.6
Bronwyn Hall (1987), in a detailed study of all U.S. manufacturing
firms in the years 1976-85, finds in approximately 600 acquisitions that
firms that are acquired do not have higher R&D expenditures (measured
by the ratio of R&D to sales) than firms in the same industry that are not
acquired. Also, she finds that "firms involved in mergers showed no
difference in their pre- and post-merger R&D performance over those
not so involved."
I know of no evidence that supports the argument that takeovers
reduce R&D expenditures, even though this is a prominent argument
among many of those who favor restrictions on takeovers.
Free Cash Flow Theory
More than a dozen separate forces drive takeover activity, including
such factors as deregulation, synergies, economies of scale and scope,
taxes, managerial incompetence, and increasing globalization of U.S.
markets.7 One major cause of takeover activity, the agency costs associ-
ated with conflicts between managers and shareholders over the payout
of free cash flow,8 has received relatively little attention. Yet it has played
an important role in acquisitions over the last decade.
Managers are the agents of shareholders, and because both parties
are self-interested, there are serious conflicts between them over the
choice of the best corporate strategy. Agency costs are the total costs that
arise in such cooperative arrangements. They consist of the costs of
monitoring managerial behavior (such as the costs of producing audited
financial statements and devising and implementing compensation
6 The "R&D Scoreboard" is an annual survey, covering companies that account for 95
percent of total private-sector R&D expenditures. The three years referenced here can be
found in "R&D Scoreboard: Reagan & Foreign Rivalry Light a Fire Under Spending," Busi-
ness Week, July 8, 1985, p. 86 ft.; "R&D Scoreboard: Now, R&D is Corporate America’s
Answer to Japan Inc.," Business Week, June 23, 1986, p. 134 ft.; and "R&D Scoreboard:
Research Spending is Building Up to a Letdown," Business Week, June 22, 1987, p. 139 ft. In
1984 the survey covered 820 companies; in 1985, it covered 844 companies; in 1986, it
covered 859 companies. 7 Roll (1988) discusses a number of these forces.
s This discussion is based on Jensen (1986).112 Michael C. Jensen
plans that reward managers for actions that increase investors’ wealth)
and the inevitable costs that are incurred because the conflicts of interest
can never be resolved perfectly. Sometimes these costs can be large, and
when they are, takeovers can reduce them.
Free Cash Flow and the Conflict Between Managers and
Shareholders
Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all of a
firm’s projects that have positive net present values when discounted at
the relevant cost of capital. Such free cash flow must be paid out to
shareholders if the firm is to be efficient and to maximize value for
shareholders.
Payment of cash to shareholders reduces the resources under man-
agers’ control, thereby reducing managers’ power and potentially sub-
jecting them to the monitoring by the capital markets that occurs when a
firm must obtain new capital. Financing projects internally avoids this
monitoring and the possibility that funds will be unavailable or available
only at high explicit prices.
Managers have incentives to expand their firms beyond the size that
maximizes shareholder wealth.9 Growth increases managers’ power by
increasing the resources under their control. In addition, changes in
management compensation are positively related to growth.1° The ten-
dency of firms to reward middle managers through promotion rather
than year-to-year bonuses also creates an organizational bias toward
growth to supply the new positions that such promotion-based reward
systems require (Baker 1986).
The tendency for managers to overinvest resources is limited by
competition in the product and factor markets that tends to drive prices
toward minimum average cost in an activity. Managers must therefore
motivate their organizations to be more efficient in order to improve the
probability of survival. Product and factor market disciplinary forces are
often weaker in new activities, however, and in activities that involve
9 Gordon Donaldson (1984), in a detailed study of 12 large Fortune 500 firms, con-
cludes that managers of these firms were not driven by maximization of the value of the
firm, but rather by the maximization of "corporate wealth." He defines corporate wealth as
"the aggregate purchasing power available to management for strategic purposes during any given
planning period .... this wealth consists of the stocks and flows of cash and cash equiv-
alents (primarily credit) that management can use at its discretion to implement decisions
involving the control of goods and services" (p. 3, emphasis in original). "In practical
terms it is cash, credit, and other corporate purchasing power by which management
commands goods and services" (p. 22).
10 Where growth is measured by increases in sales. See Murphy (1985). This positive
relationship between compensation and sales growth does not imply, although it is con-
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substantial economic rents or quasi-rents.11 Activities yielding substan-
tial economic rents or quasi-rents are the types of activities that generate
large amounts of free cash flow. In these situations, monitoring by the
firm’s internal control system and the market for corporate control are
more important. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and manag-
ers over payout policies are especially severe when the organization
generates substantial free cash flow. The problem is how to motivate
managers to disgorge the cash rather than invest it below the cost of
capital or waste it through organizational inefficiencies.
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that financial flexibility (unused debt
capacity and internally generated funds) is desirable when a firm’s man-
agers have better information about the firm than outside investors,
Their arguments assume that managers act in the best interest of share-
holders. The arguments offered here imply that such flexibility has costs;
financial flexibility in the form of free cash flow (including both current
free cash in the form of large cash balances, and future free cash flow
reflected in unused borrowing power) provides managers with greater
discretion over resources that is often not used in the shareholders’ in-
terests. Therefore, contrary to Myers and Majluf, the argument here
implies that eventually the agency costs of free cash flow cause the value
of the firm to decline with increases in financial flexibility.
The theory developed here explains (1) how debt-for-stock ex-
changes reduce the organizational inefficiencies fostered by substantial
free cash flow; (2) how debt can substitute for dividends; (3) why "diver-
sification" programs are more likely to be associated with losses than are
expansion programs in the same line of business; (4) why mergers with-
in an industry and liquidation-motivated takeovers will generally create
larger gains than cross-industry mergers; (5) why the factors stimulating
takeovers in such diverse businesses as broadcasting, tobacco, cable sys-
tems and oil are essentially identical; and (6) why bidders and some
targets tend to show abnormally good performance prior to takeover.
The Role of Debt in Motivating Organizational Efficiency
The agency costs of debt have been widely discussed (Jensen and
Meckling 1976; Smith and Warner 1979), but, with the exception of the
work of Grossman and Hart (1980), the benefits of debt in motivating
managers and their organizations to be efficient have largely been ig-
nored. Debt creation, without retention of the proceeds of the issue, enables
11 Rents are returns in excess of the opportunity cost of the permanent resources in
the activity. Quasi-rents are returns in excess of the opportunity cost of the short-lived
resources in the activity.114 Michael C. Jensen
managers effectively to bond their promise to pay out future cash flows.
Thus, debt can be an effective substitute for dividends, something not
generally recognized in the corporate finance literature.12 By issuing
debt in exchange for stock, mana~gers bond their promise to pay out
future cash flows in a way that simple dividend increases do not. In
doing so, they give shareholder-recipients of the debt the right to take
the firm into bankruptcy court if they do not keep their promise to make
the interest and principal payments.13 Thus, debt reduces the agency
costs of free cash flow by reducing the cash flow available for spending
at the discretion of managers. These Control effects of debt are a potential
determinant of capital structure.
Managers with substantial free cash flow can increase dividends or
repurchase stock and thereby pay out current cash that would otherwise
be invested in low-return projects or wasted. This payout leaves manag-
ers with control over the use of future free cash flows, but they can also
promise to pay out future cash flows by announcing a "permanent"
increase in the dividend. 14 Because there is no contractual obligation to
make the promised dividend payments, such promises are weak. Divi-
dends can be reduced by managers in the future with little effective
recourse available to shareholders. The fact that capital markets punish
dividend cuts with large stock price reductions (Charest 1978; Aharony
and Swary 1980) can be interpreted as an equilibrium market response to
the agency costs of free cash flow. Brickley, Coles and Soo Nam (1987)
find that firms that regularly pay extra dividends appear to have positive
free cash flow. In comparison with a control group they have significant-
ly higher cash plus short-term investments, and earnings plus depreci-
12 Literally, principal and interest payments are substitutes for dividends. Dividends
and debt are not perfect substitutes, however, because interest is tax-deductible at the
corporate level and dividends are not.
13 Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984a) argue that regular dividend payments can be
effective in reducing agency costs with managers by assuring that managers are forced
more frequently to subject themselves and their policies to the discipline of the capital
markets when they acquire capital.
14 Interestingly, Graham and Dodd (1951, Chapters 32, 34 and 36) in their treatise,
Security Analysis, place great importance on the dividend payout in their famous valuation
formula: V=M(D+ .33E). (See p. 454.) V is value, M is the earnings multiplier when the
dividend payout rate is a "normal two-thirds of earnings," D is the expected dividend, and
E is expected earnings. In their formula, dividends are valued at three times the rate of
retained earnings, a proposition that has puzzled many students of modern finance (at
least of my vintage). The agency cost of free cash flow that leads to overretention and
waste of shareholder resources is consistent with the deep suspicion with which Graham
and Dodd viewed the lack of payout. Their discussion (chapter 34) reflects a belief in the
tenuous nature of the future benefits of such retention. Although they do not couch the
issues in terms of the conflict between managers and shareholders, the free cash flow
theory explicated here implies that their beliefs, sometimes characterized as a preference
for "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush," were perhaps well-founded.THE FREE CASH FLOW THEORY 115
ation, relative to their total assets. They also have significantly lower
debt-to-equity ratios.
The issuance of large amounts of debt to buy back stock sets up
organizhtional incentives to motivate managers to pay out free cash
flow. In addition, the exchange of debt for stock helps managers over-
come the normal organizational resistance to retrenchment that the
payout of free cash flow often requires. The threat of failure to make
debt-service payments serves as a strong motivating force to make such
organizations more efficient. Stock repurchase for debt or cash also has
tax advantages. Interest payments are tax-deductible to the corporation,
that part of the repurchase proceeds equal to the seller’s tax basis in the
stock is not taxed at all, and prior to 1987 tax rates on capital gains were
favorable.
Increased leverage also has costs. As leverage increases, the usual
agency costs of debt, including bankruptcy costs, rise. One source of
these costs is the incentive to take on projects that reduce total firm
value but benefit shareholders through a transfer of wealth from bond-
holders. These costs put a limit on the desirable level of debt. The opti-
mal debt/equity ratio is the point at which firm value is maximized, the
point where the marginal costs of debt just offset the marginal benefits.
The debt created in a hostile takeover (or takeover defense) of a firm
suffering severe agency costs of free cash flow need not be permanent.
Indeed, sometimes "over-leveraging" such a firm is desirable. In these
situations, leveraging the firm so highly that it cannot continue to exist
in its old form yields benefits by providing motivation for cuts in expan-
sion programs and the sale of divisions that are more valuable outside
the firm. The proceeds are used to reduce debt to a more normal or
permanent level. This process results in a complete rethinking of the
organization’s strategy and structure. When it is successful, a much
leaner, more efficient, and competitive organization results.
The control hypothesis does not imply that debt issues will always
have positive control effects. For example, these effects will not be as
important for rapidly growing organizations with large and highly prof-
itable investment projects but no free cash flow. Such organizations will
have to go regularly to the financial markets to obtain capital. At these
times the markets have an opportunity to evaluate the company, its
management, and its proposed projects. Investment bankers and ana-
lysts play an important role in this monitoring, and the market’s assess-
ment is made evident by the price investors pay for the financial claims.
The control function of debt is more important in organizations that
generate large cash flows but have low growth prospects, and it is even
more important in organizations that must shrink. In these organiza-
tions the pressure to waste cash flows by investing them in uneconomic
projects is most serious.116 Michael C. Jensen
Evidence from Financial Transactions
Free cash flow theory helps explain previously puzzling results on
the effects of various financial transactions. Smith (1986, tables 1 to 3)
summarizes more than 20 studies of stock price changes at announce-
ments of transactions that change capital structure as well as various
other dividend transactions. These results and those of others are pre-
sented in table 2.
For firms with positive free cash flow, the theory predicts that stock
prices will increase with unexpected increases in payouts to sharehold-
ers and decrease with unexpected decreases in payouts. It also predicts
that unexpected increases in demand for funds from shareholders via
new issues will cause stock prices to fall. The theory also predicts stock
prices will increase with increasing tightness of the constraints binding
the payout of future cash flow to shareholders and decrease with reduc-
tions in the tightness of these constraints. These predictions do not
apply to those firms with more profitable projects than cash flow to fund
them.
The predictions of free cash flow theory are consistent with all but
three of the 32 estimated abnormal stock price changes summarized in
table 2, and one of the inconsistencies is explained by another phenom-
enon. Panel A of table 2 shows that stock prices rise.by a statistically
significant amount with announcements of the initiation of cash divi-
dend payments, increases in dividends and specially designated divi-
dends, and fall by a statistically significant amount with decreases in
dividend payments. (All coefficients in table 2 are significantly different
from zero unless noted with an asterisk.)
Panel B shows that security sales and retirements that raise cash or
pay out cash and simultaneously provide offsetting changes in the con-
straints bonding the payout of future cash flow are all associated with
returns that are insignificantly different from zero. The insignificant re-
turn on retirement of debt fits the theory because the payout of cash is
offset by an equal reduction in the present value of promised future cash
payouts. If debt sales are not associated with changes in the expected
investment program, the insignificant return on announcement of the
sale of debt and preferred also fits the theory. The acquisition of new
funds with debt or preferred stock is offset exactly by a commitment
bonding the future payout of cash flows of equal present value. If the
funds acquired through new debt or preferred issues are invested in
projects with negative net present values, the abnormal stock price
change will be negative. If they are invested in projects with positive net
present values, the abnormal stock price change will be positive.
Sales of convertible debt and preferred securities are associated with
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raise cash and provide little effective bonding of future cash flow pay-
ments; when the stock into which the debt is convertible is worth more
than the face value of the debt, management has incentives to call the
convertible securities and force conversion to common.
Panel D shows that, with one exception, security retirements that
pay out cash to shareholders increase stock prices. The price decline
associated with targeted large block repurchases (often called greenmail)
is highly likely to be due to the reduced probability that a takeover
premium will be realized. These transactions are often associated with
standstill agreements in which the seller of the stock agrees to refrain
from acquiring more stock and from making a takeover offer for some
period into the future (Mikkelson and Ruback 1985, 1986; Dann and
DeAngelo 1983; and Bradley and Wakeman 1983).
Panel E summarizes the effects of security sales and retirements that
raise cash and do not bond future cash flow payments. Consistent with
the theory, negative abnormal returns are associated with all such
changes, although the negative returns associated with the sale of com-
mon through a conversion-forcing call are statistically insignificant.
Panel F shows that all exchange offers or designated use security
sales that increase the bonding of payout of future cash flows result in
significantly positive increases in common stock prices. These include
stock repurchases and exchange of debt or preferred for common, debt
for preferred, and income bonds for preferred. The two-day gains range
from 21.9 percent (debt for common) to 1.6 percent for income bonds
and 3.5 percent for preferred.Is
The theory predicts that transactions with no cash flow and no
change in the bonding of.payout of future cash flows will be associated
with returns that are insignificantly different from zero. Panel G of table
2 shows that the evidence is mixed; the returns associated with ex-
change offers of debt for debt are significantly positive and those for
designated-use security sales are insignificantly different from zero.
All exchanges and designated-use security sales that have no cash
effects but reduce the bonding of payout of future cash flows result, on
average, in significant decreases in stock prices. These transactions in-
clude the exchange of common for debt or preferred or preferred for
debt, or the replacement of debt with convertible debt and are summa-
is The two-day returns of exchange offers and self tenders can be affected by the offer.
However, if there are no real effects or tax effects, and if all shares are tendered to a
premium offer, then the stock price will be unaffected by the offer and its price effects are
equivalent to those of a cash dividend. Thus, when tax effects are zero and all shares are
tendered, the two-day returns are appropriate measures of the real effects of the exchange.
In other cases the correct returns to be used in these transactions are those covering the
period from the day prior to the offer announcement to the day after the close of the offer
(taking account of the cash payout). See, for example, Rosenfeld (1982), whose results for
the entire period are also consistent with the theory.Table 2
Summary of Two-Day Average Abnormal Stock Returns Associated with the Announcement
of Various Dividend and Capital Structure Transactionsa
Average
Average Abnormal Free Cash Flow Theory Agreement
Type of Security Security Sample Return Predicted Agreement with Tax
Transaction Issued Retired Size (Percent) Sign with Theory? Theory
A. Dividend changes that change the cash paid to shareholders
Dividend initiation1 160 3.7% + yes no
Dividend increase2 281 1.0 + yes no
Specially designated dividend3 164 2.1 + yes no
Dividend decrease2 48 - 3.6 - yes no
Security sales (that raise cash) and retirements (that pay out cash) that simultaneously
provide offsetting changes in the constraints bonding future payment of cash flows
Security sale (industrial)4 debt none 248 -0.2* 0 yes no
Security sale (utility)5 debt none 140 - 0.1" 0 yes no
Security sale (industrial)6 preferred none 28 - 0.1" 0 yes yes
Security sale (utililty)7 preferred none 251 - 0.1" 0 yes yes
Call8 none debt 133 - 0.1" 0 yes no
Security sales that raise cash and bond future cash flow payments only minimally
Security sale (industrial)4 conv. debt none 74 -2.1
Security sale (industrial)7 conv. preferred none 54 - 1.4
Security sale (utililty)7 conv. preferred none 9 - 1,6
Security retirements that pay out cash to shareholders
Self tender offer9 none common 147 15.2
Open market purchase!° none common 182 3,3
Targeted small holdings11 none common 15 1.1











nob nobSecurity sales or calls that raise cash and do not bond future cash flow payments
Security sale (industrial)13 common none 215 - 3.0
Security sale (utility)14 common none 405 - 0.6
Conversion-forcing call~5 common conv. preferred 57 -0.4*













Exchange offers, or designated use security sales that increase the bonding of payout of future cash flows
Designated use security sale16 debt common 45 21.9 +
Exchange offer17 debt common 52 14.0 +
Exchange offer17 preferred common 10 8.3 +
Exchange offer17 debt preferred 24 3.5 +
Exchange offer18 income bonds preferred 18 1.6 +
G. Transaction with no change in bonding of payout of future cash flows
Exchange offer19 debt debt 36





Exchange offers, or designated use security sales that decrease the bonding of payout of future cash flows
Security sale2° conv. debt debt 15 - 2,4 - yes yes
Exchange offer~7 common preferred 23 -2.6 - yes no
Exchange offer~7 preferred debt 9 - 7.7 - yes yes
Security sale2° common debt 12 - 4.2 - yes yes
Exchange offer21 common debt 81 - 1.1 - yes yes
aReturns are weighted averages, by sample size, of the returns reported by the respective studies. All returns are significantly different from zero unless noted
otherwise by *
bExplained by the fact that these transactions are frequently associated with the termination of an actual or expected control bid. The price decline appears to reflect
the loss of an expected control premium.
Source: 1Asquith and Mullins 1983.2Charest 1978; Aharony and Swary 1980.3From Brickley 1983. 4Dann and Mikkelson 1984; Eckbo 1986; Mikkelson and PaRch
1986.5Eckbo 1986. 6Linn and Pinegar 1985; Mikkelson and PaRch 1986.7Linn and Pinegar 1985. 8Vu 1986. ~Dann 1981; Masulis 1980; Vermaelen 1981; Rosenfeld
1982. l°Dann 1980; Vermaelen 1981.11 Bradley and Wakeman 1983.12Calculated by Smith 1986, table 4, from Dann and DeAngelo 1983; Bradley and Wakeman 1983.
13Asquith and Mullins 1986; Kolodny and Suhler 1985; Masulis and Korwar 1986; Mikkelson and Partch 1986~ 14Asquith and Mullins 1986; Masulis and Korwar 1986;
Pettway and Radcliffe 1985 lSMikkelson 1981.16Offers with more than 50% debt. Masul~s 1980. Masulis 1983. These returns include announcement days of both the
originaf offer and, for about 40 percent of the sample, a second announcement of specific terms of the exchange. 18McConnell and Schlarbaum 1981.19Dietrich 1984.
2°Eckbo 1986; Mikkelson and Partch 1986. 21Rogers and Owers 1985; Peavy and Scott 1985; Finnerty 1985.120 Michael C. ]ensen
rized in Panel H. The two-day losses range from 7.7 percent (preferred
for debt) to 1.1 percent (common for debt).
In summary, the results in table 2 are remarkably consistent with
free cash flow theory which predicts that, except for firms with profit-
able unfunded investment projects, stock prices will rise with unexpect-
ed increases in payouts to shareholders (or promises to do so) and will
fall with reductions in payments or new requests for funds from share-
holders (or reductions in promises to make future payments). Moreover,
the size of the value changes seems to be positively related to the change
in the tightness of the commitment bonding the payment of future cash
flows. For example, the effects of debt-for-preferred exchanges are small-
er than the effects of debt-for-common exchanges.
Tax effects can explain some of the results summarized in table 2,
but not all. For example, the exchange of preferred for common, or
replacement of debt with convertible debt, has no tax effects and yet is
associated with price increases. The last column of table 2 denotes
whether the individual coefficients are explainable by pure corporate tax
effects. The tax theory hypothesizes that all unexpected changes in cap-
ital structure that decrease corporate taxes increase stock prices and vice
versa. 16 Therefore, increases in dividends and reductions of debt interest
should cause stock prices to fall, and vice versa.17 Fourteen of the 32
coefficients are inconsistent with the corporate tax hypothesis. Simple
signaling effects, where the payout of cash signals the lack of present
and future investments promising returns in excess of the cost of capital,
are also inconsistent with the results-for example, the positive stock
price changes associated with dividend increases and stock repurchases.
If anything, the results in table 2 seem too good, for two reasons.
The returns summarized in the table do not distinguish firms that have
free cash flow from those that do not have free cash flow, yet the theory
says the returns to firms with no free cash flow will behave differently
from those which do. In addition, only unexpected changes in cash
payout or the tightness of the commitments bonding the payout of fu-
ture free cash flow should affect stock prices. The studies summarized in
table 2 do not, in general, control for the presence or absence of free cash
flow or for the effects of expectations. If free cash flow effects are large
and if firms on average are in a positive free cash flow position, the
predictions of the theory will hold for the simple sample averages.
To see how the agency costs of free cash flow can be large enough to
show up in the uncontrolled tests summarized in table 2, consider the
16 See, however, Miller (1977) who argues that allowing for personal tax effects and
the equilibrium response of firms implies that no tax effects will be observed.
17 Ignoring potential tax effects due to the 85 percent exclusion of dividends received
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Firm Value as a Function












F* Free Cash Flow
Relation between the level of free cash flow and value of the firm. (F*, V*) is the level of free cash flow and
firm value that maximizes the manager’s utility. When the frequency distribution of firms is as given here, the
sample average change in firm value with respect to free cash flow (or the constraints bonding the payout
of free cash flow) will be negative.
graph of equilibrium firm value and free cash flow in figure 1. Figure 1
portrays a firm whose manager values both firm value (perhaps because
stock options are part of the compensation package) and free cash flow.
The manager, however, is willing to trade them off according to the
given indifference curves. By definition, firm value reaches a maximum
at zero free cash flow. The point (V*, F*) represents the equilibrium level
of firm value and free cash flow for the manager. It occurs at a positive
level of free cash flow and at a point where firm value is lower than the
maximum possible. The difference Vmax - V* is the agency cost of free
cash flow.
Because of random factors and adjustment costs, firms will deviate
temporarily from the optimal F*. The dashed line in figure 1 portrays a
hypothetical rectangular distribution of free cash flow in a cross section
of firms under the assumption that the typical firm is run by managers
with preferences similar to those portrayed by the given indifference
curves. Changes in free cash flow (or the tightness of constraints bind-
ing its payout) will be positively related to the value of the firm only for
the minority of firms in the cross section with negative free cash flow.
These are the firms lying to the left of the origin, 0. The relation is
negative for all firms in the range with positive free cash flow. Given the
hypothetical rectangular distribution of firms in figure 1, the majority of
firms will display a negative relation between changes in free cash flow122 Michael C. Jensen
and changes in firm value. As a result the average price change associat-
ed with movements toward (V*, F*) will be negatively related to changes
in free cash flow.
If the effects are so pervasive that they show up strongly in the
crude tests of table 2, the waste due to agency problems in the corporate
sector is probably greater than most scholars have thought. This waste is
one factor contributing to the high level of activity in the corporate con-
trol market over the past decade. More detailed tests of the propositions
that control for growth prospects and expectations will be interesting.
Evidence from Going-Private and Leveraged Buyout Transactions
Many of the benefits in going-private and leveraged buyout transac-
tions seem to be due to the control function of debt. These transactions
are creating a new organizational form that competes successfully with
the open corporate form because of advantages in controlling the agency
costs of free cash flow. In 1985, going-private and leveraged buyout
transactions totaled $37.4 billion and represented 32 percent of the value
of all public acquisitions.18 Most studies have shown that premiums
paid for publicly held firms average over 50 percent,19 but in 1985 the
premiums for publicly held firms were 31 percent (W. T. Grimm, Merger-
stat Review 1985).
Leveraged buyouts are frequently financed with high debt; 10:1 ra-
tios of debt to equity are not uncommon, and they average 5.25:1 (Schip-
per and Smith 1986; Kaplan 1987; and DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1986).
Moreover, the use of "strip financing" and the allocation of equity in the
deals reveal a sensitivity to incentives, conflicts of interest, and bank-
ruptcy costs. Strip financing, the practice in which investors hold risky
nonequity securities in approximately equal proportions, limits the con-
flict of interest among such securityholders and therefore limits bank-
ruptcy costs. Top managers and the sponsoring venture capitalists hold
disproportionate amounts of equity.
A somewhat oversimplified example illustrates the organizational
effects of strip financing. Consider two firms identical in every respect
except financing. Firm A is entirely financed with equity, and Firm B is
highly leveraged with senior subordinated debt, convertible debt, and
preferred as well as equity. Suppose Firm B securities are sold only in
strips; that is, a buyer purchasing a certain percentage of any security
must purchase the same percentage of all securities, and the securities
18 See W. T. Grimm, Mergerstat Review (1985), Figs. 29, 34 and 38.
19 See DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984), Lowenstein (1985), and Schipper and
Smith (1986). Lowenstein also mentions incentive effects of debt but argues tax effects play
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are "stapled" together so they cannot be separated later. Securityholders
of both firms have identical unlevered claims on the cash flow distribu-
tion, but organizationally the two firms are very different. If Firm A
managers withhold dividends to invest in value-reducing projects or if
they are incompetent, the shareholders must use the clumsy proxy pro-
cess to change management or policies. In Firm B, stripholders have
recourse to remedial powers not available to the equityholders of Firm
A. Each Firm B security specifies the rights its holder has in the event of
default on its dividend or coupon payment; for example, the right to
take the firm into bankruptcy or to have board representation. As each
security above equity goes into default, the stripholder receives new
rights to intercede in the organization. As a result, it is quicker and less
expensive to replace managers in Firm B.
Moreover, because every securityholder in the highly leveraged
Firm B has the same claim on the firm, there are no conflicts between
senior and junior claimants over reorganization of the claims in the
event of default; to the stripholder it is a matter of moving funds from
one pocket to another. Thus, Firm B will not go into bankruptcy; a
required reorganization can be accomplished voluntarily, quickly, and
with less expense and disruption than through bankruptcy proceedings.
The extreme form of strip financing in the example is not normal
practice. Securities commonly subject to strip practices are often called
"mezzanine" financing and include securities with priority superior to
common stock yet subordinate to senior debt. This arrangement seems
to be sensible, because several factors ignored in our simplified example
imply that strictly proportional holdings of all securities is not desirable.
For example, IRS restrictions deny tax deductibility of debt interest in
such situations and bank holdings of equity are restricted by regulation.
Riskless senior debt need not be in the strip because there are no con-
flicts with other claimants in the event of reorganization when there is
no probability of default on its payments.
Furthermore, it is advantageous to have the top-level managers and
venture capitalists who promote leveraged buyout and going-private
transactions hold a larger share of the equity. Top-level managers on
average receive over 30 percent of the equity, and venture capitalists and
the funds they represent generally retain the major share of the remain-
der (Schipper and Smith 1986; Kaplan 1987). The venture capitalists con-
trol the board of directors and monitor the managers. Both managers
and venture capitalists have a strong interest in making the venture
successful because their equity interests are subordinate to other claims.
Success requires (among other things) implementation of changes to
avoid investment in low-return projects in order to generate the cash for
debt service and to increase the value of equity. Finally, when the equity124 Michael C. Jensen
is held by a small number of people, efficiencies in risk-bearing can be
achieved by placing more of the risk in the hands of debtholders, assum-
ing the debt is held in well-diversified institutional portfolios.
Some have asserted that managers engaging in a buyout of their
firm are insulating themselves from monitoring. The opposite is true in
the typical leveraged buyout, because the venture capitalist is generally
the largest shareholder and controls the board of directors. The venture
capitalist therefore has both greater ability and greater incentives to
monitor managers than directors with little or no equity, who represent
diffused shareholders in the typical public corporation.
Leveraged buyouts increased dramatically in the last decade, from
$1.2 billion in 1979, when W. T. Grimm began collecting the data, to
$44.3 billion in 1986. Less than a handful of these management buyouts
have ended in bankruptcy, although more have gone through private
reorganizations. A thorough test of this organizational form requires the
passage of time and recessions.
Evidence from the Oil Industry
The oil industry is large and visible. It is also an industry in which
the importance of takeovers in motivating change and efficiency is par-
ticularly clear. Therefore, detailed analysis of it provides an understand-
ing of how the market for corporate control helps motivate more efficient
use of resources in the corporate sector.
Reorganization of the industry. Radical changes in the energy market
from 1973 to 1979 imply that a major restructuring of the petroleum
industry had to occur. These changes include the following:
® A tenfold increase in the price of crude oil from 1973 to 1979.
® Reduced annual consumption of oil in the United States.
® Reduced expectations of future increases in the price of oil.
® Increased exploration and development costs.
® Increased real interest rates.
As a result of these changes, the optimal level of refining and distri-
bution capacity and crude reserves fell over this period; as of the late
1970s, the industry was plagued with excess capacity. Reserves are re-
duced by reducing the level of exploration and development, and it pays
to concentrate these reductions in high-cost areas such as the United
States. Substantial reductions in exploration and development and in
refining and distribution capacity meant that some firms had to leave the
industry. Holding reserves is subject to economies of scale, while explo-
ration and development are subject to diseconomies of scale.
Price increases created large cash flows in the industry. For example,
1984 cash flows of the 10 largest oil companies were $48.5 billion or 28
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Month survey.2° Consistent with the agency costs of free cash flow, man-
agement did not pay out the excess resources to shareholders. Instead,
the oil industry continued to spend heavily on exploration and develop-
ment even though average returns on these expenditures were below
the cost of capital.
Paradoxically, the profitability of oil exploration and drilling activity
can decrease even though the price of oil increases, if the value of re-
serves in the ground falls. This decrease can occur when the price in-
crease is associated with reductions in consumption that make
marketing newly discovered oil difficult. In the late 1970s, the increased
holding costs associated with higher real interest rates, reductions in
expected future oil price increases, increased exploration and develop-
ment costs, and contrived reductions in current supply (and thus larger
future potential flows) combined to make many exploration and devel-
opment projects uneconomic. The industry, however, continued to
spend heavily on such projects.
The hypothesis that exploration and development expenditures by
the oil industry were too high during this period is consistent with the
findings of McConnell and Muscarella (1985). Their evidence indicates
that announcements of increases in exploration and development ex-
penditures by oil companies in the period 1975-81 were associated with
systematic decreases in the announcing firm’s stock price. Moreover, an-
nouncements of decreases in exploration and development expendi-
tures were associated with increases in stock prices. These results are
striking in comparison with their evidence that exactly the opposite mar-
ket reaction occurs with increases and decreases in investment expendi-
tures by industrial firms, and SEC evidence that increases in research
and development expenditures are associated with increased stock
prices.
Additional evidence of the uneconomic nature of the oil industry’s
exploration and development expenditures is contained in a study by
Bernard Picchi of Salomon Brothers (1985). His study of the rates of
return on exploration and development expenditures for 30 large oil
firms indicated that on average the industry did not earn "even a 10
percent return on its pretax outlays" in the period 1982-84. Estimates of
the average ratio of the present value of future net cash flows of discov-
eries, extensions, and enhanced recovery to expenditures for explora-
tion and development for the industry ranged from less than 0.6 to
slightly more than 0.9, depending on the method used and the year. In
other words, taking the cost of capital to be only 10 percent on a pretax
basis, the industry was realizing on average only 60 cents to 90 cents on
20 See "Cash Flow: The Top 200" (1985).126 Michael C. Jensen
every dollar invested in these activities. Picchi (1985, emphasis in origi-
nal) concludes:
For 23 of the companies in our survey, we would recommend immediate
cuts of perhaps 25%-30% in .exploration and production spending. It is
clear that much of the money that these firms spent last year on petroleum
exploration and development yielded subpar financial returns even at $30
per barrel, let alone today’s $26-$27 per barrel price structure.
The waste associated with excessive exploration and development
expenditures explains why buying oil on Wall Street was considerably
cheaper than obtaining it by drilling holes in the ground, even after
adjustment for differential taxes and regulations on prices of old oil. Wall
Street was not undervaluing the oil; it was valuing it correctly, but it was
also correctly valuing the wasted expenditures on exploration and devel-
opment that oil companies were making. When these managerially im-
posed "taxes" on the reserves were taken into account in stock prices,
the net price of oil on Wall Street was low. This low price provided
incentives for firms to obtain reserves by purchasing other oil companies
and reducing expenditures on non-cost-effective exploration. In this
way, the capital markets provided incentives for firms to make adjust-
ments that were not effectively motivated by competition in the product
markets.
High profits not usually associated with retrenchment. Adjustment by the
energy industry to the new environment has been slow for several rea-
sons. First, organizations cannot easily change operating rules and prac-
tices that have worked well for long periods in the past, even though
they do not fit the new situation. Nevertheless, survival requires that
organizations adapt to major changes in their environment.
Second, the past decade has been a particularly puzzling period in
the oil business because at the same time that changes in the environ-
ment have required a reduction of capacity, cash flows and profits have
been high. This condition is somewhat unusual in that the average pro-
ductivity of resources in the industry increased while the marginal pro-
ductivity decreased. The point is illustrated graphically in figure 2.
As the figure illustrates, profits plus payments to factors of produc-
tion other than capital were larger in 1985 than in 1973. Moreover, be-
cause of the upward shift and simultaneous twist of the marginal
productivity of capital schedule from 1973 to 1985, the optimal level of
capital devoted to the industry fell from Q1 to Q2. Thus, the adjustment
signals were confused because the period of necessary retrenchment
coincided with substantial increases in value brought about by the ten-
fold increase in the price of the industry’s major asset, its inventory of
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Optimal level of capital in the oil industry prior to 1973, Q1, and in 1985, Q2. The shaded area represents the
profits plus payments to factors of production other than capital earned by the industry in 1985. The shift in
the marginal productivity of capital schedule raised the average productivity of capital but reduced the
marginal productivity to a level below the cost of capital. As a result profits and cash flow increased, but capital
had to leave the industry.
The large cash flows and profits generated by the increases in oil
prices both masked the losses imposed by the product markets on mar-
ginal facilities and enabled oil companies to finance major expenditures
internally. Thus, the normal disciplinary forces of the product market
have been weak and those of the capital markets have been inoperative
during the entire decade.
Third, the oil companies’ large and highly visible profits subjected
them to strong political pressures to reinvest the cash flows in explora-
tion and development to alleviate the incorrect, but popular, perception
that reserves were too low. Furthermore, while reserves were on average
too high, those firms that were substantially short of reserves were
spending to replenish them to avoid the organizational consequences
associated with reserve deficiencies. The resulting excessive exploration
and development expenditures and the considerable delays in retrench-
ment of refining and distribution facilities wasted industry resources.
In sum, the stage was set for retrenchment in the oil industry in the
early 1980s, yet the product and capital markets could not force manage-
ments to change their strategy because the industry’s high internal cash
flows insulated them from these pressures. The fact that oil industry
managers tried to invest funds outside the industry is also evidence that
they could not find enough profitable projects within the industry to use
the huge inflow of resources efficiently. Unfortunately, these efforts128 Michael C. Jensen
failed. The diversification programs involved purchases of companies in
retailing (Marcor by Mobil), manufacturing (Reliance Electric by Exxon),
office equipment (Vydec by Exxon), and mining (Kennecott by Sohio,
Anaconda Minerals by ARCO, Cyprus Mines by Amoco). These acquisi-
tions turned out to be among the least successful of the last decade,
partly because of bad luck (for example, the collapse of the minerals
industry) and partly because of a lack of managerial expertise outside
the oil industry.
The effects of takeovers. Ultimately the capital markets, through the
takeover market, have begun to force managers to respond to the new
market conditions. Unfortunately, there is widespread confusion about
the important role of takeovers in bringing about the difficult but neces-
sary organizational changes required in the retrenchment.
Managers, quite naturally, want large amounts of resources under
their control to insulate them from the uncertainties of markets (Donald-
son 1984). Retrenchment requires cancellation or delay of ongoing and
planned projects. This adjustment affects the careers of the people in-
volved, and the resulting resistance means such changes frequently do
not get made without the major pressures often associated with a crisis.
A takeover attempt can create the crisis that brings about action where
none would otherwise occur.
T. Boone Pickens of Mesa Petroleum perceived early that the oil
industry must be restructured. Partly as a result of Mesa’s efforts, firms
in the industry were led to merge, and in the merging process they paid
out large amounts of capital to shareholders, reduced excess expendi-
tures on exploration and development, and reduced excess capacity in
refining and distribution. The result has been large gains in efficiency.
Total gains to the shareholders in the Gulf/Chevron, Getty/Texaco and
DuPont/Conoco mergers, for example, were over $17 billion. Much more
is possible. Jacobs (1986) estimates total potential gains of approximately
$200 billion from eliminating the inefficiencies in 98 petroleum firms as
of December 1984.
Recent events indicate that actual takeover is not necessary to in-
duce the required adjustments:
® The Phillips restructuring plan, brought about by the threat of
takeover, involved substantial retrenchment and return of re-
sources to shareholders, and the result was a gain of $1.2 billion
(20 percent) in Phillips’ market value. The company repurchased
53 percent of its stock for $4.5 billion in debt, raised its dividend
25 percent, cut capital spending, and initiated a program to sell $2
billion of assets.
® Unocal’s defense in the Mesa tender offer battle resulted in a $2.2
billion (35 percent) gain to shareholders from retrenchment and
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its equity by repurchasing stock with a $4.2 billion debt issue and
will reduce costs and capital expenditures.
The voluntary restructuring announced by ARCO resulted in a
$3.2 billion (30 percent) gain in market value. ARCO’s restructur-
ing involved a 35 percent to 40 percent cut in exploration and
development expenditures, repurchase of 25 percent of its stock
for $4 billion, a 33 percent increase in its dividend, withdrawal
from gasoline marketing and refining east of the Mississippi, and
a 13 percent reduction in its work force.
The announcement of the Diamond-Shamrock reorganization in
July 1985 provides an interesting contrast to the others and fur-
ther support for the cash flow theory, because the company’s
market value fell 2 percent on the announcement day. Because
the plan results in an effective increase in exploration and capital
expenditures and a reduction in cash payouts to investors, the
restructuring does not increase the value of the firm. The plan
involved reducing cash dividends by 76 cents per share (a cut of
43 percent); creating a master limited partnership to hold proper-
ties accounting for 35 percent of its North American oil and gas
production; paying an annual dividend of 90 cents per share in
partnership shares; repurchasing 6 percent of its shares for $200
million, selling 12 percent of its master limited partnership to the
public; and increasing its expenditures on oil and gas exploration
by $100 million per year.
Free Cash Flow Theory of Takeovers
Free cash flow is only one of approximately a dozen theories to
explain takeovers, all of which are of some relevance in explaining the
numerous forces motivating merger and acquisition activity (Roll forth-
coming 1988). The agency cost of free cash flow is consistent with a wide
range of previously unexplained data for which there has been no con-
sistent explanation. Here I sketch some empirical predictions of the free
cash flow theory for takeovers and mergers and what I believe are the
facts that lend it credence.
The positive market response to debt creation in oil and other take-
overs (Bruner 1985; Asquith, Bruner and Mullins 1987) is consistent with
the agency costs of free cash flow and the control hypothesis of debt.
The data are consistent with the notion that additional debt increases
efficiency by forcing organizations with large cash flows but few high-
return investment projects to pay out cash to investors. The debt helps
prevent such firms from wasting resources on low-return projects.
The major benefit of diversification-motivated mergers may be that
they involve less waste of resources than if the funds had been invested130 Michael C. Jensen
internally in unprofitable projects. Acquisitions made with cash or secu-
rities other than stock involve payout of resources to (target) sharehold-
ers, and this can create net benefits even if the merger creates operating
inefficiencies. To illustrate, consider an acquiring firm, A, with substan-
tial free cash flow that the market expects will be invested in low-return
projects with a negative net present value of $100 million. If Firm A
makes an acquisition of firm B that generates zero synergies but uses up
all of Firm A’s free cash flow (and thereby prevents its waste) the com-
bined market value of the two firms will rise by $100 million. The market
value increases because the acquisition eliminates the expenditures on
internal investments with negative market value of $100 million. Extend-
ing the argument, we see that acquisitions that have negative synergies
of up to $100 million in current value will still increase the combined
market value of the two firms. Such negative-synergy mergers will also
increase social welfare and aggregate productivity whenever the market
value of the negative productivity effects on the two merging firms is
less than the market value of the waste that would have occurred with
the firms’ investment programs in the absence of the merger.
The division of the gains between the target and bidding firms de-
pends, of course, on the bargaining power of the two parties. Because
the bidding firms are using funds that would otherwise have been spent
on low- or negative-return projects, however, the opportunity cost of
the funds is lower than their cost of capital. As a result, they will tend to
overpay for the acquisition and thereby transfer some, if not all, of the
gains to the target firm’s shareholders. In extreme cases they may pay so
much that the bidding firm’s share price falls, in effect giving the target
shareholders more than 100 percent of the gains. These predictions are
consistent with the evidence that shareholders of target companies reap
most of the gains from takeovers.
Acquisitions are one way managers spend cash instead of paying it
out to shareholders. Free cash flow theory implies that managers of
firms with unused borrowing power and large free cash flows are more
likely to undertake low-benefit or even value-destroying mergers. Diver-
sification programs generally fit this category, and the theory predicts
that they will generate lower total gains. Thus, some acquisitions are a
solution to the agency problems of free cash flow while others, such as
diversification programs, are symptoms of those problems.
Low-return mergers are more likely to occur in industries with large
cash flows whose economics dictate retrenchment. Horizontal mergers
(where cash or debt is the form of payment) within declining industries
will tend to create value because they facilitate exit: the cash or debt
payments to shareholders of the target firm cause resources to leave the
industry directly. Mergers outside the industry are more likely to have
low or even negative returns because managers are likely to know lessTHE FREE CASH FLOW THEORY 131
about managing such firms. Oil fits this description, and so does tobac-
co. Tobacco firms face declining demand as a result of changing smoking
habits but generate large free cash flow and have been involved in major
diversifying acquisitions recently--for example, the $5.6 billion pur-
chase of General Foods by Philip Morris. The theory predicts that these
acquisitions in nonrelated industries are more likely to reduce productiv-
ity, although the positive total gains to buyers and sellers indicate these
negative productivity effects are outweighed by the reductions in waste
from internal expansion.
Forest products is another industry with excess capacity where ac-
quisition activity is to be found--for example the acquisition of St. Regis
by Champion International and Crown Zellerbach by Sir James Gold-
smith. Horizontal mergers for cash or debt in such an industry generate
gains by encouraging exit of resources (through payout) and by substi-
tuting existing capacity for investment in new facilities by firms that are
short of capacity. Food industry mergers also appear to reflect the expen-
diture of free cash flow. The industry apparently generates large cash
flows with few growth opportunities. It is, therefore, a good candidate
for leveraged buyouts, and these are now occurring; the $6.3 billion
Beatrice leveraged buyout is the largest ever.
The broadcasting industry generates rents in the form of large cash
flows from its licenses. This industry also fits the free cash flow theory.
Regulation limits the overall supply of licenses and the number owned
by a single entity. Thus, profitable internal investments are limited, and
the industry’s free cash flow has been spent on organizational inefficien-
cies and diversification programs, making these firms takeover targets.
The CBS debt-for-stock exchange and restructuring as a defense against
the hostile bid by Turner fits the theory, and so does the $3.5 billion
purchase of American Broadcasting Company by Capital Cities Commu-
nications. Completed cable systems also create agency problems from
free cash flows in the form of rents on their franchises and quasi-rents on
their investment and are likely targets for acquisition and leveraged buy-
outs. Large cash flows earned by motion picture companies on their film
libraries also represent quasi-rents and are likely to generate free cash
flow problems. The attempted takeover of Disney and its subsequent
reorganization fit the theory. Drug companies with large cash flows from
previous successful discoveries and few potential future prospects are
also candidates for large agency costs of free cash flow.
The theory predicts that value-increasing takeovers occur in re-
sponse to breakdowns of internal control processes in firms with sub-
stantial free cash flow and organizational policies (including diver-
sification programs) that are wasting resources. It predicts hostile
takeovers, large increases in leverage, the dismantling of empires with
few economies of scale or scope to give them economic purpose (for132 Michael C. Jensen
example, conglomerates), and much controversy as current managers
object to loss of their jobs or changes in organizational policies forced on
them by threat of takeover.
Free cash flow theory predicts that many acquirers will tend to per-
form exceptionally well prior to acquisition. Empirical evidence from
studies of both stock prices and accounting data indicates exceptionally
good performance for acquirers prior to acquisition (Magenheim and
Mueller 1985; Bradley and Jarrell 1985). This exceptional stock price per-
formance is often associated with increased free cash flow, which is then
used for acquisition programs as observed in the oil industry.
Targets will be of two kinds: firms with poor management that have
done poorly before the merger, and firms that have done exceptionally
well and have large free cash flow that they refuse to pay out to share-
holders. Both kinds of targets seem to exist, but more careful study is
required. Asquith (1983) finds evidence of below-normal stock price per-
formance for 302 target firms in the 400 days before 20 days prior to the
takeover bid. Mandelker (1974) finds negative abnormal performance for
target firms in the period from 40 months before until 9 months before
the outcome of the merger bid is known. Langetieg (1978) reports sig-
nificant negative returns in the period from 72 months before until 19
months before the outcome date, but positive abnormal returns in the 19
months preceding the merger date.
The theory predicts that takeovers financed with cash and debt will
create larger benefits than those accomplished through exchange of
stock. Stock acquisitions do nothing to take up the organizations’ finan-
cial slack and are therefore unlikely to motivate managers to use re-
sources more efficiently. The recent evidence on takeover premiums is
consistent with this prediction.21
Stock acquisitions tend to be different from debt or cash acquisitions
and are more likely to be associated with growth opportunities and a
shortage of free cash flow. They therefore represent a fundamentally
different phenomenon from the nongrowth- or exit-motivated acquisi-
tions that have been occurring in the 1980s. Thus, the growth-oriented
and conglomerate mergers and acquisitions of the late 1960s and the
early 1970s reflect a different phenomenon than that represented by the
exit-motivated mergers and acquisitions of the late 1970s and 1980s.
Free cash flow theory predicts that mergers in the same line of
activity will show larger profits than diversification mergers. Elgers and
Clark (1980) find shareholders of merging firms gain more from con-
glomerate than non-conglomerate mergers, and Wansley, Lane and Yang
(1983) and Asquith and Kim (1982) find no differences in returns for
21 See Wansley, Lane and Yang (1987 forthcoming) who find higher returns to targets
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conglomerate and non-conglomerate mergers.
Palepu (1986), in the best study to date of the determinants of take-
over, finds strong evidence consistent with the free cash flow theory of
mergers. He studied a sample of 163 firms acquired in the period 1971-
79 and a random sample of 256 firms that were not acquired. Both sam-
ples were in mining and manufacturing and were listed on either the
New York or the American Stock Exchange. He finds that target firms
were characterized by significantly lower growth and lower leverage
than the nontarget firms, although there was no significant difference in
their holdings of liquid assets. He also finds that poor prior performance
(measured by the net of market returns in the four years before the
acquisition) is significantly related to the probability of takeover and,
interestingly, that accounting measures of past performance such as re-
turn on equity are unrelated to the probability of takeover. He also finds
that firms with a mismatch between growth and resources are more
likely to be taken over. These are firms with high growth (measured by
average sales growth), low liquidity (measured by the ratio of liquid
assets to total assets), and high leverage, and firms with low growth,
high liquidity, and low leverage. Finally, Palepu’s evidence rejects the
hypothesis that takeovers are due to the undervaluation of a firm’s as-
sets as measured by the market-to-book ratio.
The McConnell and Muscarella (1985) finding of positive average
market response to announcements of increases in capital expenditure
programs in all industries except oil is inconsistent with free cash flow
theory. The inconsistency between the results reported in table 2 and in
this study could occur because firms that announce changes in capital
expenditure programs tend not to have free cash flow. Resolution of
these issues awaits more explicit tests.
Free cash flow is only one of the many factors that go into a takeover
decision. But the evidence indicates that it is an important factor and
that it provides a useful perspective on the conflict.
High-Yield, Non-Investment-Grade ("Junk") Bonds
The past several years have witnessed a major innovation in the
financial markets--the establishment of active markets in high-yield
bonds. These bonds, rated below investment grade by the bond-rating
agencies, are frequently referred to as junk bonds, a disparaging term
that bears no relation to their pedigree. High-yield bonds are best
viewed as commercial loans that can be resold in secondary markets.
They are further evidence of the securitization that has converted for-
merly illiquid financial claims such as mortgages into marketable claims.
Total publicly held high-yield bonds have risen from $7 billion in 1970 to134 Michael C. Jensen
$125 billion in 1986, or 23 percent of the total corporate bond market
(Taggart 1986; Drexel Burnham Lambert 1987). By traditional standards
these bonds are more risky than investment-grade bonds, and therefore
they carry interest rates 3 to 5 percentage points higher than the yields
on government bonds of comparable maturity. In an early study, Blume
and Keim (1984) find that the default rates on these bonds have been low
and the realized returns have been disproportionately higher than their
risk.
High-yield bonds have been attacked by those who wish to inhibit
their use, particularly in the financing of takeover bids. The invention of
high-yield bonds has provided methods to finance takeover ventures
similar to those used to finance more traditional ventures. Companies
commonly raise funds to finance ventures by selling claims to be paid
from the proceeds of the venture; this is the essence of debt or stock
issues used to finance new ventures. High-yield bonds used in take-
overs work similarly. The bonds provide a claim on the proceeds of the
venture, using the assets and cash flows of the target plus the equity
contributed by the acquirer as collateral. Similarly, individuals purchase
homes using the home plus their down payment as collateral for the
mortgage. The structure of this contract offers nothing inherently
unusual.
Some might argue that the risk of high-yield bonds used in takeover
attempts is "too high." But high-yield bonds are by definition less risky
than common stock claims on the same venture since the claims of com-
mon stockholders are subordinate to those of the holders of highmyield
bonds. Would these same critics argue that the stock claims are too risky
and thus should be barred? The risk argument makes logical sense only
as an argument that transactions costs associated with bankruptcy or
recontracting are too high in these ventures, or that the bonds are priced
too high and investors who purchase them will not earn returns high
enough to compensate for the risk they are incurring. This overpricing
argument makes little sense, however, because there is vast evidence
that investors are capable of pricing risks in all sorts of other markets.
That they are peculiarly unable to do so in the high-yield bond market is
inconceivable.
In January 1986 the Federal Reserve Board issued a new interpreta-
tion of its margin rules that restricts the use of debt in takeovers to 50
percent or less of the purchase price. The rule has had little effect on
takeovers, because bidders otherwise subject to the constraint have in-
stead used high-yield preferred stock rated below investment grade,
which is converted to debt after completion of the acquisition or bridge
loans. This rule was apparently motivated by the belief that the use of
corporate debt had become abnormally and dangerously high and was
threatening the economy. This assessment is not consistent with theTHE FREE CASH FLOW THEORY 135
Table 3
Ratio of Debt to Equity as Measured by Nonfinancial Corporations
Current
Year Book Value Asset Value Market Value
1961 57.1 41.1 38.5
1962 58,2 42.5 45,6
1963 59.6 44.5 41,7
1964 59.9 45,4 39,8
1965 61.1 46,5 40.0
1966 62.7 47.4 48.4
1967 64.7 48.7 41.3
1968 67,2 50.5 40.2
1969 68.1 50.3 50.3
1970 70.5 50.7 54.7
1971 70.4 50.7 50,0
1972 70.2 50.3 48.1
I973 70.9 48.9 67.7
1974 70.2 43.9 105.2
1975 66.7 41.6 79.5
1976 65.6 41.1 74,2
1977 67.7 41.4 87,6
1978 69.1 41.1 94.8
1979 69.9 39.9 88.7
1980 68.3 37.8 70.0
1981 71.0 38.3 82.7
1982 74.3 40,0 77.7
1983 73,0 40.6 69,2
1984 81.4 46.1 80.5
1985 78.0 46.5 60.8
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
facts. Table 3 presents measures of debt use by nonfinancial corporations
in the United States. The debt-equity ratio is measured relative to three
bases: market value of equity, estimated current asset value of equity,
and accounting book value of equity measured at historical cost.
Although debt-equity ratios were higher in 1985 than in 1961, they
were not at record levels. The ratio of debt to book value of equity
reached a high of 81.4 percent in 1984 but declined to 78.0 percent in
1985. Debt-equity ratios in which equity is measured on an historical
cost basis are relatively high now because of the previous decade of
inflation. The ratio of debt to current asset value of equity, which takes
account of inflation, was 50.7 percent in 1970 compared to 46.5 percent
in 1985. The market-value ratio rose from 54.7 percent in 1970 to 80.5
percent in 1984 and then plummeted to 60.8 percent in 1985. The 1985
market-value ratio was 44 percentage points below its 1974 peak of 105.2136 Michael C. Jensen
percent. Thus, the Federal Reserve System’s own data are inconsistent
with the reasons given for its restrictions on the use of debt.
High-yield bonds were first used in a takeover bid in early 1984 and
have been involved in relatively few bids in total. In 1984, only about 12
percent of the $14.3 billion of new high-yield debt was associated with
mergers and acquisitions. The following year, 26 percent of the $14.7
billion of new high-yield debt was used in acquisitions.22 According to
Mergers & Acquisitions, 1986 acquisitions-related high-yield debt still rep-
resented less than one of every 12 dollars in acquisition value. Neverthe-
less, high-yield bonds are an important innovation in the takeover field
because they help eliminate mere size as a deterrent to takeover. They
have been particularly influential in helping to bring about reorganiza-
tions in the oil industry.
Historical default rates on high-yield bonds have been low, but
many of the bonds are so new that the experience could prove to be
different in the next downturn. Various opponents (including executives
who desire protection from the takeover market and members of the
financial community, such as commercial banks and insurance compa-
nies, who want to restrict competition from this new financing vehicle)
have backed regulations and legislation to restrict the issuance of high-
yield bonds, to penalize their tax status, and to restrict their holding by
thrifts, which can now buy them as substitutes for the issuance of non-
marketable commercial loans. These proposals are premature, to say the
least.
The holding of high-yield bonds by thrifts is an interesting issue.
The recent deregulation of the banking and thrift industries presents
many opportunities and challenges to the thrifts. Elimination of restric-
tions on interest paid to depositors has raised the cost of funds to these
institutions. Thrifts have also received the right to engage in new activi-
ties such as commercial lending. Survival requires thrifts to take advan-
tage of some of these new business opportunities.
The organizational costs of developing commercial lending depart-
ments in the 3500 thrifts in the country will be substantial. Thousands of
new loan officers will have to be hired and trained. The additional wage
and training costs and the bad-debt losses that will be incurred in the
learning phase will be substantial. High-yield bonds provide a potential
solution to this problem. If part of the commercial lending function
could be centralized in the hands of investment bankers who provide
commercial loans in the form of marketable high-yield debt, a thrift
could substitute the purchase of this high-yield debt for its own com-
mercial lending and thereby avoid the huge investment in such loan
departments.
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Conclusion
Although economic analysis and the evidence indicate that the mar-
ket for corporate control is benefiting shareholders, society, and the cor-
poration as an organizational form, it is also making life more
uncomfortable for top-level executives. This discomfort is creating
strong pressures at both the state and federal levels for restrictions that
will seriously cripple the workings of this market. In 1985, 1986 and 1987
dozens of bills on this topic were in the congressional hopper, all pro-
posing various restrictions on the market for corporate control. Some
proposed major new restrictions on share ownership and financial in-
struments. Within the past several years the legislatures of numerous
states have passed antitakeover laws and the U.S. Supreme Court has
recently upheld the Indiana law that prohibits someone who purchases
20 percent or more of a firm’s shares without permission of the board of
directors from voting those shares unless such approval is granted by
majority vote of disinterested shareholders. New York state law now
bars the purchaser of even 100 percent of a firm’s shares from doing
anything with the assets for five years unless permission of the incum-
bent board is obtained.
This political activity is another example of special interests using
the democratic political system to change the rules of the game to benefit
themselves at the expense of society as a whole. In this case, the special
interests are top-level corporate managers and other groups who stand
to lose from competition in the market for corporate control. The result
will be a significant weakening of the corporation as an organizational
form and a reduction in efficiency.138 Michael C. Jensen
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Edward J. FrydI*
Does a process of mergers and acquisitions that results in a more
leveraged corporate sector strengthen or weaken the economy? Michael
Jensen answers this question by using the free cash flow model. This
model implies that increased leverage, or other change in financial struc-
ture that reduces the free cash flow under management discretion, im-
proves the value of the firm and is therefore of overall economic benefit.
Under this view, management refrains from paying out dividends or
taking other actions that constrain free cash flow, in order to avoid the
discipline of recurrent financing in the capital markets. Furthermore,
managers are viewed as less knowledgeable about capital investment
opportunities overall than the market at large. In such circumstances,
increased leverage, such as that achieved through the substitution of
debt for equity, can be of economic benefit through the efficienc~y gains it
brings about.
Jensen does note in passing that potential bankruptcy costs are a
counterweight to the benefits of leverage and that highly debt-intensive
acquisitions such as management-led leveraged buyouts have yet to be
tested by the difficult phase of the business cycle. And he does stop
short of claiming that the free cash flow model is a fully sufficient expla-
nation of merger activity. All these qualifications aside, however, the gist
of Jensen’s message is clear: more cokporate leverage brought about by
real or potential takeovers is better.
My comments on this line of argument fall into two classes: those
that express some doubts about the adequacy of the underlying free
*Vice President and Assistant Director of Research, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. The views expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of any part
of the Federal Reserve System.DISCUSSION 145
cash flow model and those that question whether the benefits of lever-
age implied by that model are the only consequences worth concern.
Is the Free Cash Flow Model Adequate?
Time Series Patterns
In support of the free cash flow model, Jensen has marshalled an
impressive array of cross-sectional evidence from unrelated studies.
That model, however, appears to be less useful in explaining the most
prominent stylized fact of time series data on mergers and acquisitions,
the existence of distinct merger waves. Corporate sector cash flow has a
cyclical character; merger waves, despite the name, do not. If excess
cash flows are generated by relative price swings--a factor cited as im-
portant in the oil industry mergers--takeover activity should be more
randomly distributed over time.
Indeed, of the four factors that Jensen cites as behind the 1980s
merger wave--O) easier antitrust enforcement, (2) withdrawal of re-
sources from declining industries, (3) deregulation in various sectors
and (4) changes in "takeover technology," including the availability of
finance---only the third meshes well with the free cash flow model. The
first and last factors, basically changes in behavior at the Justice Depart-
ment and at investment banks, are, I agree, major causes of the merger
wave. But what do they have to do with the excess cash flow of firms?
And declining industries, like the poor, we will always have with us.
Why are they specific to the 1980s? Yes, the sectoral deregulation of
recent years can affect the cash flows of firms and create merger opportu-
nities, But not all deregulations work that way. Some, such as regional
banking pacts, lessen a direct constraint on mergers without directly
affecting cash flow. Others, such as telephone industry deregulation,
lead to divestitures, not mergers.
Managers and Raiders
The free cash flow theory rests on an assumption that profit maximi-
zation is systematically violated. In Jensen’s formulation, managers do
not maximize the value of the firm but instead optimize a broader utility
function that includes free cash flow as an argument. This variable does
not enter as a "good" in and of itself, but stands in proxy for something
like an easy life in the executive suite. But in any realistic managerial
utility function, job security must surely count as an argument. No ra-
tional, utility-maximizing manager will willingly turn himself into shark
bait. However, the systematic relation between job security and free146 Edward J. Frydl
cash flow will be negative. And in that case, there is no longer a clear
presumption that the manager’s optimum differs from the corner solu-
tion of profit maximization.
But let us assume that agency costs do introduce a tendency to
deviate from the economic optimum. Takeovers are portrayed as a sys-
tematic correction to this tendency. At this point a questionable asym-
metry gets slipped in: managers have human weakness that leads to
deviations from optimum but acquirers always spot value. But why
should they? Raiders are not a random sample of the market at large.
The recurrence of the same names~Pickens, Posner, Icahn, Goldsmith,
and so on--at least suggests that the thrill of the hunt may supplement
cold calculation. Once we allow that raiders may have motives beyond
maximizing value, presumptions about the benefits of takeovers get
murkier. But do not takeovers drive up stock prices? Yes, but maybe
raiders overpay. Post-takeover operating profits do not paint so convinc-
ing a picture of efficiency gains.
Is More Leverage Better?
From the viewpoint of the free cash flow model, greater leverage is a
benefit since it puts management under the whip and promotes efficien-
cy. But there can be negative effects from leverage as well.
Inefficiencies from Leverage
Consider leveraged buyouts. Most of the concern about these deals
is that the high degree of debt creates financial risk. But in many exam-
ples this has hardly been so. In these leveraged buyouts, asset sales
have yielded the new owners rates of return on equity of several hun-
dred percent in very short order, sometimes less than a year. No finan-
cial risk here. The realization of operating efficiencies is unlikely to
account for such a quick big payoff. Rather, management had a better
awareness of the true value of corporate assets than the stock market
did. In such circumstances, there may be a problem of fair treatment
involved but not a problem of economic efficiency. But, in theory any-
way, ready access to leveraged buyout finance could worsen agency-cost
inefficiencies. It could induce management to favor investments in proj-
ects with backloaded or relatively obscure payoffs that will appear rela-
tively unprofitable to the general market, which will be lacking crucial
information. The firm will then be truly undervalued and management
can capture the benefits through a leveraged buyout. But the investment
projects that maximize the leveraged buyout payoff need not be the best
economically.DISCUSSION 147
Macrofinancial Risk
Concerns about the macrofinancial risks of corporate leverage have
been expressed scores of ways. I want to make only one minor point
along those lines. Takeover finance is a field of competition between
commercial banks that lend and investment banks that can arrange
funds in securities markets. With commercial banks under general com-
petitive pressures, they are more inclined to be aggressive in this field.
Now if the typical bank-financed takeover is the high-payoff leveraged
buyout mentioned earlier, there is no problem. To the contrary, it would
be one of the least risky loans for banks. But many leveraged buyouts do
have a high degree of financial risk. And through bank financing those
risks put another weight on the integrity of the deposit base.
As a final point, I feel compelled to defend the honor of the Federal
Reserve against some extreme charges on the matter of the application of
margin rules to takeover debt financing. Jensen writes: "This rule was
apparently motivated by the belief that the use of corporate debt had
become abnormally and dangerously high and was threatening the
economy." He then cites numbers that show that on a book-value basis,
debt-equity ratios are historically high, but on a replacement cost or
"market-value" basis they are not. And he concludes: "the Federal
serve System’s own data are inconsistent with the reasons given for its
restrictions on the use of debt."
Give us a break! First, Jensen’s market-value ratio is really the ratio
of book debt to market equity. New York Fed estimates of the market
value of debt yield a ratio that does not "plummet" in 1985, a year of
falling interest rates. It does not go to a new historical peak, but it
remains far above the levels of the 1960s.
Second, if the Fed thought debt was dangerously high and a threat
to the economy, I hope it would act with more resolve than through an
essentially technical clarification of margin requirements--prompted, I
will note, by an inquiry from an interested party to a takeover bid--that
restricts financing through a shell operation only to 50 percent debt
financing. The action taken was commensurate with the problem per-
ceived. Chairman Greenspan has recently testified that he does not see
corporate indebtedness as an immediate threat to the economy.
Third, the use of preferred stock in place of debt in takeover finance
complies with the requirement. That this does not apparently restrict
takeover activity is a free market decision. I can see no evidence that the
intention of the Fed decision was to restrict takeovers. However, the
view that preferred stock is the same thing as debt strikes me as bizarre
and is reminiscent of the view that perpetual floating-rate notes are
really a money market instrument. At a minimum, holders of preferred
cannot start bankruptcy actions if dividends are interrupted.148 Edward J. Frydl
A final comment. At some points I have taken issue with Jensen’s
findings. But the whole body of his research on takeovers is one of the
brighter lights shining on a topic still wrapped in dark emotions. His
work has defined the terms of the debate. And for readers with open
minds, it has shaken loose some of the blinders of prejudice.